The Institute for the Study of War
The Weekly Standard
August 2007
https://www.understandingwar.org/report/irans-proxy-war-against-united-states-and-iraq
https://drive.google.com/file/d/14dwV9aOUvdR15ZBpf26oM6Mf_teZ6spm/view?usp=sharing
Summary
Iran, and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah, have been actively involved in supporting Shia militias and encouraging sectarian violence in Iraq since the invasion of 2003 - and Iranian planning and preparation for that effort began as early as 2002. The precise purposes of this support are unclear and may have changed over time. But one thing is very clear: Iran has consistently supplied weapons, its own advisors, and Lebanese Hezbollah advisors to multiple resistance groups in Iraq, both Sunni and Shia, and has supported these groups as they have targeted Sunni Arabs, Coalitions forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and the Iraqi Governments itself. Their influence runs from Kurdistan to Basra, and Coalition sources report that by August 2007, Iranian-backed insurgents accounted to roughly half the attacks on Coalition forces, a dramatic change from previous periods that had seen the overwhelming majority of attacks coming from the Sunni Arab insurgency and al Qaeda.
The coalition has stepped-up its effort to combat Iranian intervention in Iraq in recent months both because the Iranians have increased their support for violence in Iraq since the start of the surge and because Coalition successes against al Qaeda in Iraq and the larger Sunni Arab insurgency have permitted the re-allocation of resources and effort against a problem that has plagued attempts to establish a stable government in Iraq from the outset. With those problems increasingly under control, Iranian intervention is the next major problem the Coalition must tackle.
Major points about Iranian support for Shia violence in Iraq:
• Planning began in 2002, operations began during the invasion of 2003;
• Iran has imported numerous Lebanese Hezbollah trainers and advisors into Iraq;
• The Iranian Qods Force directly oversees Iranian efforts in Iraq, and cell leaders in Iraq including Iraqi and Lebanese Hezbollah operatives, report directly and indirectly to Qods Force commanders in Teheran;
• The Qods Force has established a network of "secret cells" within the Shia militias that their agents control for the purpose of assassinating key leaders, conduction death-squad activities, and distributing highly-lethal weapons for use against American forces;
• Iran supports Ansar al Sunnah, a Sunni terrorist group with close links to al Qaeda, with training camps inside Iran and further assists the group with operations in Iraq;
• Iran provides its Iraqi proxies with advanced weapons, including light and heavy mortars, 107-mm and 204-mm rockets, advanced large-caliber sniper rifles, and explosive-formed penetrators (EFPs), capable of penetrating tank armor;
• Iranian rockets and mortars have been fired by secret cells against both the American and the Iraqi portion of the "Green Zone" in Baghdad, and against Coalition bases around the country;
• American and Iraqi forces have responded to these attacks by conducting numerous Special Forces raids against key leaders in the Iranian network, and a number of more conventional operations in Baghdad, Diwaniyah, and elsewhere;
• The Iranians have consistently denied any involvement in the violence in Iraq, including during face-to-face tripartite meetings between U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, the Iranian ambassador to Iraq, and Iraqi Government; and
• These negotiations with Iran, including the establishment of a tripartite sub-ambassadorial level coordinating committee on security in Iraq, have coincided with a significant increase in Iranian support for violence in Iraq.
Summary
Iran, and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah, have been actively involved in supporting Shia militias and encouraging sectarian violence in Iraq since the invasion of 2003 - and Iranian planning and preparation for that effort began as early as 2002. The precise purposes of this support are unclear and may have changed over time. But one thing is very clear: Iran has consistently supplied weapons, its own advisors, and Lebanese Hezbollah advisors to multiple resistance groups in Iraq, both Sunni and Shia, and has supported these groups as they have targeted Sunni Arabs, Coalitions forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and the Iraqi Governments itself. Their influence runs from Kurdistan to Basra, and Coalition sources report that by August 2007, Iranian-backed insurgents accounted to roughly half the attacks on Coalition forces, a dramatic change from previous periods that had seen the overwhelming majority of attacks coming from the Sunni Arab insurgency and al Qaeda.
The coalition has stepped-up its effort to combat Iranian intervention in Iraq in recent months both because the Iranians have increased their support for violence in Iraq since the start of the surge and because Coalition successes against al Qaeda in Iraq and the larger Sunni Arab insurgency have permitted the re-allocation of resources and effort against a problem that has plagued attempts to establish a stable government in Iraq from the outset. With those problems increasingly under control, Iranian intervention is the next major problem the Coalition must tackle.
Major points about Iranian support for Shia violence in Iraq:
• Planning began in 2002, operations began during the invasion of 2003;
• Iran has imported numerous Lebanese Hezbollah trainers and advisors into Iraq;
• The Iranian Qods Force directly oversees Iranian efforts in Iraq, and cell leaders in Iraq including Iraqi and Lebanese Hezbollah operatives, report directly and indirectly to Qods Force commanders in Teheran;
• The Qods Force has established a network of "secret cells" within the Shia militias that their agents control for the purpose of assassinating key leaders, conduction death-squad activities, and distributing highly-lethal weapons for use against American forces;
• Iran supports Ansar al Sunnah, a Sunni terrorist group with close links to al Qaeda, with training camps inside Iran and further assists the group with operations in Iraq;
• Iran provides its Iraqi proxies with advanced weapons, including light and heavy mortars, 107-mm and 204-mm rockets, advanced large-caliber sniper rifles, and explosive-formed penetrators (EFPs), capable of penetrating tank armor;
• Iranian rockets and mortars have been fired by secret cells against both the American and the Iraqi portion of the "Green Zone" in Baghdad, and against Coalition bases around the country;
• American and Iraqi forces have responded to these attacks by conducting numerous Special Forces raids against key leaders in the Iranian network, and a number of more conventional operations in Baghdad, Diwaniyah, and elsewhere;
• The Iranians have consistently denied any involvement in the violence in Iraq, including during face-to-face tripartite meetings between U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, the Iranian ambassador to Iraq, and Iraqi Government; and
• These negotiations with Iran, including the establishment of a tripartite sub-ambassadorial level coordinating committee on security in Iraq, have coincided with a significant increase in Iranian support for violence in Iraq.
